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THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
J. R. SCARTH,

*

Petitioner and
Appellee,
v.

*

BRIEF OP APPELLANT

*

Civil No. 920580-CA

G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, Bureau
Chief, Drivers License
Division for the State of
Utah,
Respondent and
Appellant.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is in the Court of Appeals based upon Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2A-3(2)(a) (1992).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court improperly credit the time Petitioner's
driving privileges were temporarily reinstated pending trial
toward his 120-day suspension?
This is a question of law and the Court should accord no
deference to the district court judgment and should review the
matter on a "correctness" standard.

State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d

1150, 1161 (Utah 1991); Rollins v. Peterson. 813 P.2d 1156, 1159
(Utah 1991).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-130(7) (1988):
(b) A second or subsequent suspension under this
subsection is for a period of 120 days, beginning on
the 31st day after arrest.
The statute has been recently amended, effective April 27, 1992,
to require a one-year suspension for second and subsequent
suspension.

Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-130 (7) (b) (Cum. Supp. 1992).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS
This appeal is from a portion of the final judgment and
decree of the Sixth Judicial District Court, Kane County, the
Honorable Don B. Tibbs presiding, involving the judicial review
of an informal adjudicative proceeding of the Drivers License
Division.
Petitioner sought judicial resview of the administrative
action of the respondent suspending Petitioner's driving
privileges for a period of 120 days, commencing March 11, 1992,
for driving or being in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while having a breath alcohol content above .08%.
Verified Petition for Reinstatement of Drivers License, R. at 40.
On April 20, 1992 Petitioner obtained an ex parte order
reinstating his driving privileges pending judicial review.
Temporary Order Reinstating Driving Privileges and drivers
2

license, R. at 38. After the June 25, 1992 hearing on judicial
review, the trial court affirmed the 120-day suspension and
immediately vacated its temporary order.

However, the trial

court included as part of the suspension period the time from
April 20, 1992 through June 25, 1992, the time when the trial
court had reinstated the Petitioner's driving privileges pending
trial.

See Order Affirming Suspension of Petitioner's Driving

Privileges for a Period of 120 Days, Addendum Item B,R. at 5.
Respondent has appealed that portion of the Order, claiming that
the Petitioner is required by law to serve 120 days of actual
suspension.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner is required to serve a period of 120 days of
suspension of his driving privileges for driving or being in the
actual physical control of the motor vehicle while having a
breath alcohol content above .08%, since this was his second
suspension within five years. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-130(7)
(1988).

Pending trial in the district court, the Petitioner

obtained temporary relief that reinstated his driving privileges,
but that should not allow him substantive relief from the 120-day
statutory suspension period.

The court should not allow the days

when the Petitioner's driving privileges were reinstated to count
toward the 120 days of suspension.
3

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CREDITED TOWARD
PETITIONER'S 120-DAY SUSPENSION THE DAYS WHEN HIS
DRIVING PRIVILEGES WERE REINSTATED PENDING TRIAL.
The Petitioner's driving privileges were suspended by
the Respondent pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-130 (1988), for
the reason that Petitioner had driven or been in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle while having a breath alcohol content
above .08 percent.

Since this was his second suspension, the

suspension period was 120 days.
(1988).

Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-130(7)

Petitioner sought judicial review of the Suspension

Order by way of a trial de novo in District Court.

Utah Code

Ann. § 41-2-131(1) (Supp. 1991).
As an action seeking to review the administrative order
of the Respondent, this action was governed by the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-0.5
et seq. (Supp. 1992).
(Utah App. 1990).

Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587

After filing the Petition, the Petitioner

obtained an ex parte order entitled "Temporary Order Reinstating
Driving Privileges and Driver's License," directing the
Respondent to restore and return Petitioner's driving privileges
to him "pending final determination in this cause." R. at 38
Respondent objected immediately to the ex parte proceedings and
the order.

R. at 20.
4

After the hearing on the merits of judicial review, the
trial court indicated that it was ruling in favor of the
Respondent Driver's License Division, affirming Petitioner's
suspension, and immediately vacated the temporary order
reinstating the driving privileges. Most important to this
appeal, the trial court then directed that the suspension period
would be 120 days commencing the 31st day after the arrest, and
the suspension period would include the period when the trial
court had reinstated and "stayed" the suspension order by the
Respondent.

R. 5, Order Affirming Suspension (Addendum Item B ) .

Respondent here contends that the trial court erred in counting
the period of time that Petitioner retained his license under the
temporary order towards the 120-day period of suspension.
The Uniform Operator License Act, Utah Code Ann. §412-130(7) (1988), provides that:
(7) A second or subsequent suspension under
this section is for a period of one hundred
twenty (120) days, beginning on the 31st day
after the date of arrest.
The plain meaning of the statute is that the Petitioner should be
required to serve a 120-day period of "suspension."

"Suspension"

is defined as:
the temporary withdrawal by action of the
division of a licensee's privilege to operate
a motor vehicle.

5

Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-102(28) (Supp. 1992).

Thus, the period

when his driving privileges were reinstated by the temporary
court order should not count toward that period of suspension nor
should he be entitled to credit for those days he was allowed to
drive, as during that time he was not under "suspension."
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, the court
is authorized, in certain instances, to "grant a stay or other
temporary remedy," pending judicial review.
46b-18 (Supp. 1992).

Utah Code Ann. § 63-

Although not denominated as such, the

temporary order granting the Petitioner driving privileges
pending judicial review must be considered a "stay or other
temporary remedy" pursuant to that section.

A properly obtained

stay should not grant, nor be allowed to grant, substantive
relief from the administrative order, but should merely suspend
enforcement of that order pending judicial review.
Rhodes, 472 F. Supp. 603, 605 (D.C. Ohio 1979).

See Reed v.

When a court

subsequently vacates the stay, the original order should be
enforceable.
In this case, the trial court allowed the time when the
Petitioner's driving privileges were temporarily returned to him
pending trial to be counted toward his period of suspension.
This was improper, as it allows the temporary order to grant
substantive relief to the Petitioner, thereby shortening the
6

period of suspension by 66 days.

The trial court should have

entered its order affirming the suspension of the driving
privileges of the Petitioner for a period of 120 days from the
date of its order, allowing as a credit toward the period of
suspension only the time spent on actual suspension, here 54
days.

The Petitioner should be required to spend the statutory

period of 120 days with his driving privileges suspended and not
be allowed to drive for any of those 120 days.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should
reverse that portion of the Order of the district court giving
credit toward the period of suspension when Petitioner's driving
privileges were reinstated and direct the district court to order
that the Petitioner's driving privileges be suspended for a
period of 120 days commencing upon entry of the district court's
new order, giving credit only for the number of days the
Petitioner had previously spent on actual suspension.
Respectfully submitted this

/

day of

1993.
THOM D. ROBERTS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed two
true and correct copies, of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to
the following this

\ ^

day of

-^J &.CA.S/«./^

1993:
J. R. SCARTH, Pro Se Petitioner
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741
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ADDENDUM A

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
THOM D. ROBERTS (2773)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR KANE
STATE OF UTAH
J. R. SCARTH,
Petitioner,
vs.
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, Bureau
Chief, Drivers License
Division for the State of
Utah,
Respondent.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 920600020
Judge Don V. Tibbs

The above entitled matter having come on regularly for
hearing on Thursday, June 25, 1992, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs,
District Court Judge, presiding, Petitioner appearing in person
and representing himself, and the Respondent appearing through
counsel, Thorn D. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General, and the
proceedings being held in the District Court in and for Sevier
County, by prior agreement and stipulation of the parties, and
the Court having heard the evidence offered by the parties,
arguments on their behalf, and being fully advised in the
premises, hereby makes and enters its:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That shortly after midnight on February 10, 1992,

the Petitioner was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
in Kanab City, Kane County, State of Utah.
2.

That at that time, the vehicle was apparently "hung

up" and stuck in a ditch at the side of the road, that the car
lights were on, the engine running, the transmission engaged, and
the rear wheels spinning.

The Petitioner was in the driver's

seat and was in control of the vehicle.
3.

That Officer Doug Crosby of the Kanab City Police

approached the vehicle because the car and/or driver appeared to
be in difficulty and to ascertain the nature of the problem.
4.

Upon approaching the vehicle and making contact

with the Petitioner, the officer noticed an odor of alcohol and
other indications of intoxication and asked the Petitioner if he
would perform some field sobriety tests. The Petitioner agreed
and performed and/or attempted to perform the field sobriety
tests, generally in an unsatisfactory manner.
5.

Based upon the officer's observations of the

Petitioner, he reasonably concluded and had probable cause to
believe and believed that the Petitioner had been driving or was
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of

safely operating a motor vehicle, and therefore placed the
Petitioner under arrest for driving under the influence.
6.

That after placing Petitioner under arrest, the

officer reasonably requested that the Petitioner submit to a
breath test, which the Petitioner agreed to perform.
7.

That for a period in excess of 15 minutes prior to

the breath test, the officer had the Petitioner under constant
observation, and for that period of time Petitioner consumed no
food or drink or otherwise put or had anything in his mouth.
8.

That the officer properly operated the machine,

following the approved operational checklist and complied with
all matters pursuant to his training to insure a proper test
result.
9.

That the calibration and testing for the accuracy

of the intoxilyzer were performed in accordance with the
standards established by the Commissioner of Public Safety, and
that the affidavits regarding the machine were prepared in the
regular course of the public officer's duty, that they were
prepared contemporaneous with the act, condition or event
described therein, and that the source of information from which
made and the method and circumstances of their preparation were
such as to indicate their trustworthiness.
10.

That the results of the intoxilyzer on the

Petitioner accurately reflected his breath alcohol content.

11.

That the intoxilyzer results and the breath

alcohol concentration of the Petitioner were .17 percent.
12.

That the officer, after filling out the paperwork,

personally served upon the Petitioner a DUI summons and citation
and the notice, on behalf of the Driver License Division, of the
Division's intent to suspend the driving privileges of the
Petitioner.
13.

At the time of officer's initial observance of the

Petitioner in the vehicle, the Petitioner was under the influence
of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely
operating a motor vehicle.
The Court, having heretofore made and entered its
Findings of Fact, now hereby makes and enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the Petitioner was lawfully arrested for

driving under the influence of alcohol.
2.

That the driving privileges of the Petitioner were

subject to suspension based upon his driving or being in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely
operating a motor vehicle, and based upon his driving or being in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle with a breath alcohol
content in excess of .08 percent.

3.

That this Court should enter an order affirming the

suspension of the driving privileges of the Petitioner for a
period of 120 days, and make its own order to such an effect.

DATED this

3

day of M 0 6>U ST

. 1992.

BY THE COURT:

DON V/. TIBBS
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:

\L^£. SCARTH
Petitioner Pro Se
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following this

sM

1992:
J. R. SCARTH, Pro Se Petitioner
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741

(y^ day of

ADDENDUM B

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
THOM D. ROBERTS (2773)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR KANE
STATE OF UTAH
J. R. SCARTH,
Petitionee
vs.
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, Bureau
Chief, Drivers License
Division for the State of
Utah,
Respondent.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

ORDER AFFIRMING SUSPENSION OF
PETITIONERS DRIVING
PRIVILEGES FOR A PERIOD OF
120 DAYS
Civil No. 920600020
Judge Don V. Tibbs

The above entitled matter having come on regularly for
hearing on Thursday, June 25, 1992, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs,
District Court Judge, presiding, Petitioner appearing in person
and representing himself, and the Respondent appearing through
counsel, Thorn D. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General, and the
proceedings being held in the District Court in and for Sevier
County, by prior agreement and stipulation of the parties, and
the Court having heard the evidence offered by the parties,
arguments on their behalf, and being fully advised in the
premises, and the Court having previously entered the Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law and being fully advised in the
premises, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the decision of the
Respondent suspending the driving privileges of the Petitioner
for a period of 120 days, commencing March 11, 1992, shall be and
is hereby affirmed; it is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the previously
entered Temporary Order Reinstating Driving Privileges and
Drivers License was vacated at the conclusion of the hearing in
this case on June 25, 1992, and is of no further force and
effect; and it is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the period during
which the order of suspension by the Respondent was stayed and of
no force and effect pursuant to the above-mentioned Temporary
Order Reinstating Driving Privileges and Drivers License,
consisting of the period from April 20, 1992 up to and including
June 25, 1992, does not alter or effect the period of suspension,
and that therefore the period of suspension shall expire 120 days
after March 11, 1992, which is July 9, 1992; and that therefore
on and after July 10, 1992, Petitioner shall be entitled to apply
for reinstatement and obtain reinstatement of his driving

privileges, should he otherwise so qualify.

DATED this 3>

. 1992.

day of

BY THE COURT:

S
DON V. 'TIBBS
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:

-?

^^y^

R. SCARTH
Petitioner Pro Se
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AFFIRMING SUSPENSION OF
PETITIONER'S DRIVING PRIVILEGES FOR A PERIOD OF 120 DAYS to the
following this ^ T ^ day o f ^ A j 1 w T ^

IP"-

, 1992:

J. R. SCARTH, Pro Se Pet
76 North Main
itixioner
Kanab, Utah 84741

